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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The global reach of U.S. antitrust law under the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvement Act (FTAIA) has been much debated.1 In recent years, this debate has 
focused on whether foreign plaintiffs can use the U.S. legal system to remedy their 
foreign antitrust injuries resulting from alleged anticompetitive effects on U.S. 
markets.2 Less focus, however, has been devoted to understanding the scope of the 
FTAIA with respect to domestic plaintiffs who have been injured in the United 
States by foreign anticompetitive conduct.3 This lack of focus stems from the limited 
case law interpreting the FTAIA’s requirement of showing a direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce. The antitrust community often 
refers to this requirement as the “domestic effects” exception.4 If a company’s conduct 
fits within the domestic effects exception, the FTAIA will apply, giving U.S. courts 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
 Indeed, while courts have analyzed the domestic effects exception in FTAIA 
litigation, most courts have struggled with defining the substantive limits imposed 
by each individual requirement of the exception.5 Most notably, courts have failed to 
define “direct,” the first requirement of the exception. Absent clear guidance on 
1. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
2. See, e.g., Susan E. Burnett, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-Laroche? Conflicts 
of Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial Antitrust, 18 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 555 (2004) 
(criticizing the FTAIA’s second prong and arguing for a stronger nexus between foreign plaintiffs’ 
harms and U.S. domestic effects); Stephanie A. Casey, Balancing Deterrence, Comity Considerations, and 
Judicial Efficiency: The Use of the D.C. Circuit’s Proximate Cause Standard for Determining Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Antitrust Cases, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 585 (2005) (suggesting the adoption 
of proximate cause in cases involving foreign plaintiffs); Ryan A. Haas, Act Locally, Apply Globally: 
Protecting Consumers from International Cartels by Applying Domestic Antitrust Law Globally, 15 Loy. 
Consumer L. Rev. 99 (2003); Evan Malloy, Comment, Closing the Antitrust Door on Foreign Injuries: 
U.S. Jurisdiction over Foreign Antitrust Injuries in the Wake of Empagran, 38 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 395 
(2006); Andrew Stanger, Analyzing U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction over Foreign Parties After Empagran S.A. 
v. F. Hoffman-Laroche, Ltd., 2003 BYU L. Rev. 1453 (2003) (analyzing the second prong of the 
FTAIA); Eric Taffet, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act’s Domestic Injury Exception: A Nullity 
for Private Foreign Plaintiffs Seeking Access to American Courts, 50 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 216 (2011); 
Kelly Tucker, Note, In the Wake of Empagran—Lights Out on Foreign Activity Falling Under Sherman Act 
Jurisdiction? Courts Carve Out a Prevailing Standard, 15 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 807 (2009) 
(exploring the avenues of suit available to foreign and domestic plaintiffs post Empagran).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (providing that the Sherman Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce 
with foreign nations unless such conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on 
U.S. import commerce).
4. Another term used in the antitrust arena to describe this requirement is the “direct effects” exception. For 
consistency, this article uses the term “domestic effects.” See Ian Simmons & Bimal Patel, One Hundred 
Years of (Attempted) Solitude: Navigating the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 24 Antitrust 72, 74 
(2010); Publishers Editorial Staff, Corporate Counsel’s Guide to International Antitrust § 8:8 
(2013) (“There are two recognized exceptions—the ‘effects exception’ and the ‘import trade or commerce 
exception.’”).
5. At least one court has defined the “reasonably foreseeable” requirement. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. 
China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1744 (2012) (defining 
“reasonably foreseeable” as whether the effect would have been known to an objective, reasonable person 
making practical business decisions).
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what connection is required between foreign anticompetitive conduct and domestic 
effects to meet the “direct” requirement, U.S. companies purchasing products from 
foreign companies will find it difficult to determine whether they can remedy their 
antitrust injuries under U.S. antitrust law. The following hypothetical illustrates this 
struggle.
 Suppose that foreign company A, which manufactures input component parts, 
restricts the supply of these component parts in an effort to artificially raise prices in 
foreign markets. Foreign company A then sells the component parts to foreign 
company B by forcing it into higher-priced contracts. In turn, foreign company B 
incorporates the component parts into final products that are then sold to U.S. 
company C at higher prices. Lastly, these products are sold to U.S. consumers at 
higher prices.6 From an antitrust law perspective, U.S. company C and its consumers 
will have paid a higher price than they would have paid had foreign company A not 
forced foreign company B into anticompetitive contracts. But is foreign company A 
liable to U.S. company C under U.S. antitrust laws? Should foreign company A be 
held accountable, if at all, under the laws of the country where foreign company A 
committed the anticompetitive acts?
 Not surprisingly, it is difficult to imagine that foreign antitrust regimes offer 
adequate legal remedies to protect companies like U.S. company C and its consumers.7 
The most obvious reason being that the harm caused by foreign company A’s conduct 
is generally not felt in the country where it operates.8 This raises the question: Does 
the FTAIA allow U.S. companies to seek a remedy under U.S. antitrust law for 
injuries arising out of anticompetitive activities in foreign markets? The answer 
depends on the legal standard adopted for the individual requirements of the 
domestic effects exception.
6. Of course, this example is far from just a hypothetical. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the 
U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, N.Y. Times (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/
apple-america-and-a-squeezed-middle-class.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1 (“For technology companies, the 
cost of labor is minimal compared with the expense of buying parts and managing supply chains that bring 
together components and services from hundreds of companies.”); see also Alicia Batts & Keith Butler, 
Recovery in the United States for Price-Fixing Abroad: The Future of FTAIA Litigation, CPI Antitrust 
Chron., Nov. 16, 2011, at 2, available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/recovery-in-the-
u-s-for-price-fixing-abroad-the-future-of-ftaia-litigation/ (“As global economic trade has increased, so has 
the number of price-fixing plaintiffs who have sought recovery in U.S. courts under U.S. antitrust laws for 
damages suffered as a result of cartel activity abroad.”).
7. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The host country for the cartel 
will often have no incentive to prosecute it. [Foreign countries] would logically be pleased to reap 
economic rents from other countries; their losses from higher prices for [the product] used . . . are more 
than made up by the gains from the cartel price their exporters collect.”). But see, e.g., Agreement 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European 
Communities Regarding Application of Their Competition Laws, 30 I.L.M. 1487 (Sept. 23, 1991).
8. Similarly, U.S. antitrust law is grounded in the same principle. Indeed, the FTAIA does not concern 
itself with any conduct—domestic or foreign—that affects only foreign markets. See Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582–84 (1986) (“Respondents cannot recover antitrust 
damages based solely on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because American antitrust 
laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations’ economies.”).
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 Defining the applicable legal standard of the domestic effects exception is crucial 
to protecting competition in the United States, especially when U.S. international trade 
has significantly increased over the past decades.9 Above all, the meaning of “direct” is 
at the core of understanding Congress’s desire to protect U.S. companies and their 
consumers from foreign anticompetitive practices without compromising the intended 
reach of U.S. antitrust law. But what does “direct” mean in the context of the domestic 
effects exception? Until now, only the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have defined 
“direct,” and each has reached a different interpretation.10 This difference in opinion 
underscores the need for a precise meaning of “direct” under the FTAIA.11
 Unfortunately, neither court has clarified how “direct” fits within the overall 
scheme of the domestic effects exception. The Seventh Circuit in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. 
Agrium, Inc., defined “direct” as a “reasonably proximate causal nexus.”12 This overly 
broad interpretation fails to clarify the outer limits of U.S. antitrust law. In stark 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., defined “direct” 
as an “immediate consequence.”13 This narrow interpretation overly restricts the reach 
of U.S. antitrust law. Notwithstanding these divergent interpretations, some 
commentators argue that the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception merely codified 
existing common law interpreting “direct.”14 But until a definitive interpretation is 
adopted, courts must continue to wrestle with the statute’s language.15
9. In 1990, for example, import and export commerce of trade in goods and services reached approximately 
$500 billion. In 2010, those levels reached over $2 trillion. See Natalie Soroka, U.S. Dep’t of Com., 
Int’l Trade Admin., U.S. Trade Overview (2012), available at http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/
groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_002065.pdf; see also Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal 
of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1, 74 (1992) (“The growing 
significance of international trade and investment has increasingly led the United States and other 
nations to devote regulatory attention to conduct occurring abroad.”).
10. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 860; United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., 379 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 
2004).
11. LSL, 379 F.3d at 684 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“Although other appellate courts have dodged the 
critical issue on which this appeal turns, this panel has decided to face the dragon in his teeth and stop 
tap dancing around the meaning of the word ‘direct.’”). 
12. 683 F.3d at 857.
13. 379 F.3d at 680 (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992)).
14. 1B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 272 (3d ed. 2006) (arguing that 
the FTAIA was merely a codification of the existing “direct effects” test); see also LSL, 379 F.3d at 689 
(Aldisert, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Hovenkamp and Areeda that the FTAIA was meant to codify 
the existing “direct effects” test).
15. Some academics and commentators have argued for and against amending the FTAIA but agree that, 
in principle, this solution may be implausible. See, e.g., Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five 
Years of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 285, 337, 345 (2007) 
(“Amendments to the FTAIA should be avoided as almost certainly ineffective at accomplishing their 
intended result and possibly deleterious to the worthy goal of ‘respect[ing] appropriate jurisdictional 
boundaries.’”) (citation omitted); Taffet, supra note 2, at 250–52 (suggesting possible congressional 
clarification of the domestic effects exception but recognizing the danger of exposing the statute to the 
political process).
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 This note proposes that courts interpreting “direct” under the domestic effects 
exception should use a legal standard found in tort law doctrine—the scope of risk 
standard. The scope of risk standard draws from common law principles that have been 
extensively analyzed in tort law jurisprudence.16 From a qualitative viewpoint, tort law 
and antitrust law share similar goals: both seek to deter harmful behavior by holding 
actors accountable for harms caused by their conduct, and both seek to compensate the 
victim for any injuries resulting from this harmful conduct.17 Analyzing the term 
“direct” through the lens of established tort law causation principles will provide greater 
clarity to courts applying the domestic effects exception in future FTAIA litigation. 
What is more, the scope of risk standard is consistent with the purpose of the FTAIA: 
to provide certainty to the business community in assessing whether U.S. antitrust laws 
apply to international business transactions.18 Indeed, the scope of risk standard will 
help courts focus on furthering Congress’s goal of limiting U.S. antitrust law to 
transactions that have a “direct” effect on U.S. commerce.
 Following this introduction, Part II of this note briefly reviews the extraterritorial 
reach of U.S antitrust law before the FTAIA was enacted. Part III examines the case 
law that has analyzed the domestic effects exception and the circuit split that has 
emerged over the meaning of “direct.”
 Part IV analyzes the scope of risk standard in tort law and suggests that, when 
determining directness under the FTAIA, courts should consider whether the 
anticompetitive effect on U.S. domestic commerce was proximately caused by the 
foreign actor’s anticompetitive conduct. This inquiry will focus on the scope of risks 
that made the actor’s conduct anticompetitive in the first place. In this way, courts 
will analyze each requirement of the domestic effects exception conjunctively. As a 
result, the law governing the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law under the 
FTAIA will develop consistently throughout the courts.
 Part V highlights the benefits of this new approach and demonstrates the 
applicability of the scope of risk standard to the hypothetical posed in the introduction 
and to the facts from the Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases. The scope of risk standard 
isolates the relationship between the foreign conduct and the resulting effect on U.S. 
markets from other considerations such as reasonable foreseeability and substantiality. 
As a result, courts can appropriately consider the facts distinct to each requirement of 
the domestic effects exception.
16. See Robert E. Keeton, Legal Cause in the Law of Torts 1–20 (1963); Warren Seavey, Mr. Justice 
Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 20 (1939).
17. See Practising L. Inst. N.Y.C., Antitrust Law Answer Book 31 (Joe Sims et al. eds., 2012) (“Any 
person who is injured in his or her ‘business or property’ as a result of conduct forbidden by the federal 
antitrust laws may file a private lawsuit under section 4 of the Clayton Act.”); Dan B. Dobbs et al., 
Dobbs’ Law of Torts § 10 (2d ed. 2013) (“Today’s tort law has much grander aims. All of the aims are 
laudable, but sometimes one of them will conflict with another. The most commonly mentioned aims of 
tort law are (1) compensation of injured persons and (2) deterrence of undesirable behavior.”); see also 
Michael A. Carrier, A Tort-Based Causation Framework for Antitrust Analysis, 77 Antitrust L.J. 991, 
1004 (2011) (“[O]n a broad level, the antitrust and tort fields share similar goals in seeking to deter and 
compensate for behavior that falls below certain standards and causes certain types of harm.”).
18. See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
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 Finally, Part VI brief ly discusses international comity concerns between the 
United States and foreign sovereigns. It suggests that the scope of risk standard will 
further Congress’s intent to balance the international reach of U.S. antitrust law 
against the need to respect the legal regimes of sovereign nations. 
ii. briEf histOrY Of thE EXtratErritOriaL rEaCh Of U.s. antitrUst LaW
 A. The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law Before the FTAIA
 Long before the FTAIA, U.S. courts had difficulty defining the reach of U.S. 
antitrust law.19 This difficulty stemmed from applying the Sherman Act, the 
landmark statute regulating U.S. competition, to international transactions. The 
Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with Foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”20 In applying this broad provision 
to international transactions, two different schools of thought emerged.21 One school 
of thought, which was first introduced in the famous opinion by Justice Holmes in 
American Banana v. United Fruit Co., focused on a strict territoriality approach: if the 
alleged anticompetitive conduct occurred in another country, that country’s laws 
should govern.22 Because most businesses conducted transactions locally, the rationale 
behind this approach seemed logical to the Court at the time. This logic, although 
simple in application, did not stand the test of time.23 Indeed, the globalization of 
trade, the rise of multinational corporations, and the emergence of new economies 
forced lawmakers and the judiciary to rethink how U.S. antitrust law would govern 
foreign business transactions.24
 As a result of the globalization of commerce, a competing school of thought 
began to garner support. This competing approach focused on a broader interpretation 
of U.S. antitrust laws: the Sherman Act would regulate any alleged anticompetitive 
conduct that was intended to produce, and indeed produced, an “effect” on U.S 
19. See Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law: 
What Is a “Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect” Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act?, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 11, 13 (2003).
20. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
21. See, e.g., Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 14, ¶ 272c.
22. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he general and almost universal 
rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the 
country where the act is done.”); Simmons & Patel, supra note 4, at 72 (“Justice Holmes took the former 
view, often referred to as the ‘territoriality’ approach . . . .”).
23. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945); Simmons & Patel, 
supra note 4, at 72 (“Over time, as economies worldwide grew more interdependent, the inf luence of this 
‘territoriality’ logic faded.”).
24. See generally Robert Pachike, Globalization, Interdependence, and Sustainability, in 1 Introduction to 
Sustainable Development 187 (David V.J. Bell & Yuk-kuen Annie Cheung eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C13/E1-45-03-16.pdf.
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domestic commerce.25 This “effects” principle was drawn from the seminal Alcoa 
case, where Judge Hand succinctly stated: “[It] is settled law . . . that any state may 
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its 
borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends . . . .”26 
From the Alcoa decision up until the enactment of the FTAIA, courts used different 
tests to determine whether foreign anticompetitive conduct fell under the Sherman 
Act’s purview.27 As a consequence, the application of the “effects” principle became 
unclear, inconsistent, and failed to define the scope of the extraterritorial reach of the 
Sherman Act.28
 Although the FTAIA was enacted in 1982, in part to clarify the “effects test,”29 
the Supreme Court, eleven years later in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 
returned to the broader school of thought articulated in the Alcoa decision.30 In 
Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court addressed a conspiracy allegation involving the 
market for reinsurance, with U.K. insurers owning the lion’s share of the market.31 
The conspiracy involved both U.S. and U.K. insurers who targeted primary insurance 
markets in the United States by forcing certain primary insurers to change the 
standard terms in their policies for the benefit of the conspirators’ business.32 Without 
placing much reliance on the FTAIA, the Court effectively adopted the Alcoa “effects 
test” and held that the Sherman Act applies to “foreign conduct that was meant to 
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”33 Based 
on this “effects test,” the Court further held that a restraint on reinsurance in the 
United Kingdom had a sufficiently “direct” effect on primary insurance in the United 
25. Simmons & Patel, supra note 4, at 72. Under common law this had become known as the “effects test.” 
Under the “effects test,” the location of the alleged conduct was irrelevant; instead, the guiding force was 
whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct produced meaningful effects on U.S. commerce. Id.
26. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
27. After the Alcoa decision, the circuit courts created different analytical frameworks under the “effects 
test.” Compare Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (employing a 
three-part balancing test for extraterritorial jurisdiction that combines elements of a pure jurisdictional 
inquiry with general comity concerns), with Nat’l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 
8–9 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that the threshold question is whether the conduct “can be foreseen to have 
any appreciable anticompetitive effect on United States commerce”). This note brief ly explores the issue 
of prescriptive comity, and will argue that the scope of risk standard, understood as a limitation of 
liability when interpreting “direct” under the FTAIA, furthers Congress’s goal in addressing foreign 
conduct that affects only U.S domestic commerce. See discussion infra Part VI.
28. The hearing records to the proposed bill for the FTAIA suggest that ambiguities existed in the precise 
legal standard to be used in determining whether American antitrust law applied to a particular 
transaction. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-686 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2487 [hereinafter 
FTAIA Report].
29. While not its primary purpose, Congress also sought to clarify the existing uncertainty in the 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct. See id. 
30. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 764.
33. Id. at 796.
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States.34 But the Court did not explicitly address the FTAIA’s applicability. Without 
much scrutiny, the Court held that the circumstances met the domestic effects 
exception.35 In doing so, the Court left open the question of whether the statute was 
meant to codify the Alcoa “effects test.”36
 The Hartford Fire decision presumably furthered the debate on whether the 
statute’s domestic effects test was meant to replace or codify existing common law.37 
Notwithstanding this debate, this note posits that, unless Congress or the Supreme 
Court resolves the codification issue and adopts a clear standard, courts will continue 
to face difficulty interpreting the FTAIA. The next section explores the FTAIA in 
more detail.
 B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act 
 Amid the uncertainty surrounding the scope of U.S. antitrust law as applied to 
transactions involving foreign commerce, U.S. businesspeople and legal practitioners 
grew cautious in their business dealings, fearing possible antitrust violations. One 
major problem was that antitrust concerns often prevented potential transactions from 
gaining momentum.38 The inherent difficulty and the high costs of determining 
whether potential transactions would run afoul of U.S. antitrust law prevented 
businesses from beginning fruitful negotiations.39 As a result, businesses grew 
concerned that U.S. antitrust laws were counterproductive, and undermined their 
34. Id. at 775, 796.
35. Id. at 797.
36. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 n.23 (“Also unclear is whether the Act’s ‘direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect’ standard amends existing law or merely codifies it. We need not address 
these questions here. Assuming that the FTAIA’s standard affects this litigation, and assuming further 
that that standard differs from the prior law, the conduct alleged plainly meets its requirements.”).
37. Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at ¶ 272c; see also Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of 
the Sherman Act: Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign Conduct, 61 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 415, 418–19 (2005) (“The common law standard for the reach of the 
Sherman Act to foreign conduct may or may not have changed with the enactment of the FTAIA in 
1982; the legislative history does not answer this question . . .  .”); Huffman, supra note 15, at 313 
(reasoning that “[t]he FTAIA codified a version of the Alcoa effects test”). To be sure, the House 
Report does indicate that the FTAIA would “serve as a simple and straightforward clarification of 
existing American law and the Department of Justice enforcement standards.” FTAIA Report, supra 
note 28, at 2487–88.
38. FTAIA Report, supra note 28, at 2491 (“As the business roundtable has stated, ‘antitrust considerations 
typically enter the picture long before a business transaction is explored in depth.’”); see also Edward D. 
Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign Transactions Under the Antitrust Laws: 
The New Frontier in Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. Rev. 2151, 2158 (2003).
39. FTAIA Report, supra note 28, at 2491; see also Saul P. Morgenstern & Margaret A. Prystowsky, 
Competition & Antitrust Law, in International Corporate Practice: A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Global Success § 26:1 (Carole L. Basri ed., 2008) (“Competition laws affect many activities that are 
central to doing business—pricing, marketing, licensing, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, 
participation in trade and professional associations, even social contract with employees of competitors . . . .”).
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ability to compete.40 In response to these growing concerns, Congress enacted the 
FTAIA as part of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982.41 The FTAIA provides 
that the Sherman Act
shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than 
import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless—
(1)  such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect—
 (A)  on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with 
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce 
with foreign nations; or 
 (B)  on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, 
of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the 
United States; and 
(2)  such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 
1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.42
 Although Congress had various reasons for enacting the FTAIA,43 legal commentators 
agree that Congress’s overriding purpose was to help promote and encourage U.S. 
export trade.44 To further this purpose, Congress exempted from the Sherman Act 
“export transactions that did not injure the United States economy.”45 In this way, 
small and large U.S. businesses could enter into business arrangements, such as joint-
40. FTAIA Report, supra note 28, at 2489 (recognizing that antitrust law was prohibiting and discouraging 
pro-competitive export activities).
41. 15 U.S.C § 6a (2012). 
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See Huffman, supra note 15, at 304–05.
44. Beckler & Kirtland, supra note 19, at 13 (stating that “Congress’s goal [was to] facilitat[e] the domestic 
export of goods by exempting certain export trade from the Sherman Act’s reach”); Huffman, supra note 
15, at 305 (analyzing Congress’s intent to facilitate export trading activities); see also FTAIA Report, supra 
note 28, at 2487 (expounding that the purpose of promoting U.S. export trading was a result of an 
“apparent perception among businessmen that American antitrust laws [were] a barrier to joint export 
activities that promote efficiencies in the export of American goods and services[,]” and although Congress 
recognized that the FTAIA would not “be a panacea for the many problems that [affected] American 
export trade,” it did believe that the FTAIA would “encourage the business community to engage in 
efficiency producing joint conduct in the export of American goods and services”); see also A Bill to Amend 
the Sherman Act and Clayton Act to Exclude from the Application of Such Acts Certain Conduct Involving 
Exports: Hearing on S. 795 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1-10 (1981)  [hereinafter FTAIA 
Hearing] (statement of Hon. Strom Thurmond, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (recognizing that, 
even if such perception is erroneous, the business community perceives that under existing law, collective 
export activity may give rise to liability under the antitrust laws).
45. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796–97 n.23 (1993).
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selling and joint-venture agreements, despite their anti-competitiveness, so long as 
these agreements affected only foreign markets.46
 At the same time, Congress addressed the scope of the Sherman Act with respect 
to international transactions.47 Congress enacted the FTAIA intending to clarify the 
“proper test for determining whether the United States antitrust jurisdiction over 
international transactions exists.”48 This test ostensibly created a straightforward, 
objective standard providing courts with jurisdiction for antitrust claims where a 
foreign company’s anticompetitive conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce.”49
 But this new test is anything but straightforward. For one, Congress did not 
expressly define what constitutes “direct” or “substantial.”50 Further, few courts have 
provided meaningful interpretations of the FTAIA,51 let alone specific definitions of 
“direct,” “substantial,” and “reasonably foreseeable.”52 So, then, how should courts 
confront the domestic effects exception? One view may be that the common law 
46. At the Senate hearing it was stated that the “purpose to this legislation is to aid the efforts of American 
business to compete vigorously and effectively throughout the world.” See FTAIA Hearing, supra note 
44, at 1.
47. See  Spencer Weber Waller,  The  Twilight of Comity, 38  Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 563, 574 (2000) 
(describing the uncertainty of the scope of U.S. antitrust law to international transactions).
48. FTAIA Report, supra note 28, at 2487. Indeed, the House Report stated that a related problem was the 
“effects test” articulated by Judge Hand in Alcoa, and the precise limitations that U.S. antitrust law had 
involving foreign conduct. Id. at 2490. 
49. FTAIA Report, supra note 28, at 2487–88 (“[E]nactment of a single, objective test—the ‘direct, substantial, 
and reasonably foreseeable effect’ test will serve as . . . [a] clear benchmark . . . for our businessmen, 
attorneys and judges as well as our trading partners.”). Before the FTAIA was enacted, courts did not use 
the words “reasonably foreseeable” under the common law “direct effects” test. Instead, they focused on the 
subjective element of an actor’s intent. The FTAIA removes any inquiry into the actor’s subjective intent. 
Id. at 2494 (“An intent test might encourage ignorance of the consequences of one’s actions, which in this 
context, would be an undesirable result.”). This highlights the debate around whether the FTAIA was 
meant to codify existing common law. Huffman, supra note 15, at 313.
50. See Huffman, supra note 15, at 317 (recognizing the ambiguity with placing “direct” and “substantial” in the 
conjunctive). The House Report did, however, provide guidance on what it meant by “reasonably 
foreseeable.” FTAIA Report, supra note 28, at 2494 (“The test is whether the effects would have been evident 
to a reasonable person making practical business judgments, not whether actual knowledge or intent can be 
shown.”). But see Am. Bar Ass’n, Sec. of Antitrust Law, Report to Accompany Resolutions 
Concerning Legislative Proposals To Promote Export Trading 10 (1981) (recognizing that “courts 
and commentators may not always see eye to eye on what constitutes ‘substantiality’ and ‘foreseeability’”). 
51. Simmons & Patel, supra note 4, at 72 (“[F]rom 1982 to 1997, no court construed the meaning of the FTAIA, 
even though forty-six decisions mentioned the statute.”); see also United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., 
379 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Federal courts did not shower the FTAIA with attention for the first 
decade after its enactment.”); Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Although passed two decades ago, few federal courts have had occasion to apply the [FTAIA].”).
52. See, e.g., United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 952 (7th Cir. 2003)  (en banc), 
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003) (treating the FTAIA as jurisdictional in nature); Carpet Group Int’l 
v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, Inc., 227 F.3d 62, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that the FTAIA did not 
apply because anticompetitive conduct affected import commerce); Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable 
& Wireless, PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1998)  (holding that the court had subject matter 
jurisdiction when plaintiff ’s complaint alleged harm to U.S. advertisers).
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“effects test” from Alcoa should govern the analysis of the terms “direct, substantial, 
and reasonably foreseeable.”53 But critics of this view accurately point out an important 
distinction between the “effects test” and the domestic effects exception: the domestic 
effects exception focuses on objective criteria54 whereas the “effects test” focuses on a 
subjective inquiry of whether an actor intends to reduce competition in the United 
States.55 Pre-FTAIA cases, therefore, provide limited guidance on the limitations 
imposed by the conjunctive requirements of the domestic effects exception because 
terms like “reasonable foreseeability” and “substantiality” were not central to the 
analysis. Today, the FTAIA is the governing law for antitrust cases involving foreign 
transactions, and courts must interpret the domestic effects exception when deciding 
whether the Sherman Act controls the conduct in question.56
 The Ninth and Seventh Circuits recently interpreted the FTAIA and tackled the 
definition of “direct” head on.57 In United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit was the first court to expressly define “direct” under the domestic effects 
exception; it held that an effect is “direct” if it “follows as an immediate consequence of 
the defendant’s activity.”58 Eight years later, the Seventh Circuit in Minn-Chem v. 
Agrium, Inc. expressly rejected the LSL definition as too restrictive; instead, it defined 
“direct” as a “reasonably proximate causal nexus” between conduct and effect.59 
Although both definitions arguably give teeth to this opaque statute, neither definition 
provides a clear standard that can be applied uniformly in future FTAIA cases. The 
next Part will describe how the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ inconsistent definitions 
lead to problematic results when analyzing the domestic effects exception.
iii. thE CirCUit spLit
 In many ways, the FTAIA proves difficult to interpret.60 Many scholars, 
academics, and judges opine that the FTAIA is anything but unequivocal.61 Perhaps 
53. Judge Aldisert’s dissent in LSL supports this position. LSL, 379 F.3d at 684 (“I believe that the new 
statute merely codified existing antitrust law in the use of the word ‘direct.’”).
54. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
55. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1981); Mannington Mills, 
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291–92 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of 
Am., 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976).
56. See LSL, 379 F.3d at 688. 
57. Compare Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2012), with LSL, 379 F.3d at 
680. 
58. LSL, 379 F.3d at 680.
59. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857.
60. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 14, ¶ 272 (opining that the FTAIA is “cumbersome” and 
contains “inelegant language”).
61. Simmons & Patel, supra note 4, at 72; Delrahim, supra note 37, at 419 (recognizing the opinion that the 
FTAIA is “inelegantly phrased”); Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 
2000); see also United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The FTAIA is 
inelegantly phrased and the court in Hartford Fire declined to place any weight on it.”).
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that is why no settled definition of “direct” under the domestic effects exception 
exists. Nevertheless, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have at least attempted, albeit 
without consensus, to clarify the global reach of U.S. antitrust law. These two 
competing approaches are detailed in the next section.
 A. The Ninth Circuit’s “Immediate Consequence” Approach
 In 2004, the Ninth Circuit addressed a restraint-on-trade antitrust case involving 
a private joint venture that sought to distribute fresher and better tasting tomatoes to 
the northern part of the United States during the winter season.62 Shortly after the 
joint venture failed, the U.S. government brought suit and challenged a 
noncompetition agreement between the producers of the long-shelf-life tomato seeds 
at issue.63 Specifically, the agreement between LSL Biotechnologies, Inc. and 
Hazera, a foreign company based in Israel, restricted Hazera from selling long-shelf-
life tomato seeds in North America; it did, however, permit Hazera to sell other 
types of seeds, including seeds for growing tomatoes in greenhouses.64 Based on this 
noncompetition agreement, the U.S. government alleged that American consumers 
would be harmed, because this agreement unreasonably reduced competition to 
“develop better seeds for fresh market, long-shelf-life tomatoes for sale in the United 
States.”65 The government supported these allegations of potential anticompetitive 
effects on the U.S. markets in two ways. First, the government argued that the 
agreement would hinder the research and development of fresher tomato seeds, 
because Hazera was less likely to develop these seeds absent an ability to market 
them in the United States.66 Second, the government argued that because Hazera 
was a major player in the production of these seeds, the exclusion of Hazera from the 
market would allow LSL to charge more for its seeds than it otherwise would.67
 The district court dismissed the government’s complaint on two grounds. First, 
the court held that the complaint failed to establish anticompetitive effects in the U.S. 
markets.68 It did so by adopting the defendant’s argument that the noncompetition 
agreement did not have a direct effect on the tomato market in the United States 
because the agreement covered the development of seeds and not tomatoes.69 This 
distinction was significant for the district court because it found that the price increase 
in the seeds—which contributed less than 1% to the cost of the tomatoes—could have 
62. LSL, 379 F.3d at 674.
63. Id. at 675.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 676.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 674.
69. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., No. 00CV529, 2002 WL 31115336, at *12–13 (D. Ariz. 
Mar. 28, 2002).
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only a negligible effect on the price of the tomatoes.70 Second, the court reasoned that 
it lacked jurisdiction over the claim that restricting the sale of seeds in Mexico violated 
the Sherman Act, because the defendant’s activity was limited to the development of 
seeds in Mexico, and therefore the defendant had no control over the related prices 
being charged for the tomatoes in the U.S. markets.71 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court and found that the government failed to allege any conduct 
that had a “‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on [U.S.] domestic 
commerce or import trade.”72
 The Ninth Circuit construed “direct” by primarily relying on two different 
sources: a dictionary definition from 1982 and a Supreme Court case—Republic of 
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.—concerning the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA).73 Weltover held that a “direct effect” is one that follows as an “immediate 
consequence of the defendant’s activity.”74 In applying this definition to the domestic 
effects exception of the FTAIA, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[a]n effect cannot 
be ‘direct’ where it depends on such uncertain intervening developments.”75 On that 
basis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the agreement restricting Hazera from 
developing the long-shelf-life seeds was not “direct” because there was an intervening 
development—Hazera’s ability to create these long-shelf-life seeds—that, according 
to the court, was “speculative at best.”76 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the domestic effects exception was not met.77
 In 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware followed the LSL 
approach in In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litigation.78 AMD, a 
microprocessor manufacturer, alleged that its competitor Intel had willfully 
monopolized the microprocessor market by engaging in harmful business practices 
that affected the sale of AMD’s microprocessors in foreign countries.79 To show a 
direct effect on U.S. competition, AMD argued that, although AMD’s manufacturing 
was in Germany, and it assembled final products in Malaysia, Singapore, and China, 
“Intel’s foreign conduct and the foreign harm it caused [were] inextricably bound 
with Intel’s domestic conduct restraining trade and the resulting domestic antitrust 
70. Id. at *18.
71. Id. 
72. LSL, 379 F.3d at 679–80.
73. Id. at 680 (discussing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992), where the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a statute that forecloses immunity to commercial 
conduct that has a “direct” effect on the United States). In analogizing to that case, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that “the Court reject[ed] the suggestion that [‘direct’] contains any unexpressed requirement of 
‘substantiality’ or ‘foreseeability.’” Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 681.
76. Id. at 681–82.
77. Id.
78. 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 560–61 (D. Del. 2006).
79. Id. at 557–59.
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injury to AMD.”80 Intel moved to dismiss the case for failing to meet the requirements 
of the domestic effects exception.81
 As a threshold matter, the court adopted LSL’s interpretation of “direct” to mean 
an “immediate consequence” of the alleged anticompetitive conduct with no 
intervening developments.82 The court then reasoned that AMD’s allegations could 
be characterized as a speculative “chain of effects . . . full of twists and turns” that 
were themselves speculative.83 Because AMD’s allegations of anticompetitive effects 
on the U.S. market rested on speculative factors affecting its business and investment 
decisions in the global market, the court determined that these effects were akin to 
“ripple effects” and therefore could not be direct.84 Although the court used different 
phraseology to describe the lack of directness, it endorsed the “immediate 
consequence” standard.
 B. The Seventh Circuit’s “Reasonably Proximate Causal Nexus” Approach 
 The Seventh Circuit in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc. took a different approach 
than the Ninth Circuit by broadly construing the meaning of “direct.” In Minn-
Chem, the court addressed a global price-fixing case involving the production and 
sale of potash, a naturally occurring mineral used in agricultural fertilizers.85 Direct 
and indirect purchasers of potash brought suit against Agrium and other major 
potash producers that dominated the industry by alleging that they conspired to 
inflate global prices in violation of the Sherman Act.86 Specifically, the purchasers 
alleged that foreign producers of potash, which were primarily located in Russia and 
Belarus, conspired to restrain the global output of potash in an effort to artificially 
inf late prices in foreign markets.87 Producers then negotiated prices in foreign 
80. Id. at 559. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 560 (quoting LSL, 379 F.3d at 680–81).
83. In re Intel, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 560. 
84. Id. at 563. But see In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953, 954–55 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
TFT-LCD involved allegations that producers of f lat panel LCD displays engaged in a global price-
fixing conspiracy. Id. at 954–55. The district court implicitly adopted the LSL definition of “direct” as 
an “immediate consequence” but came to a different conclusion than the Intel court. In re TFT-LCD, 
822 F. Supp. 2d at 964. Focusing on the chain of events alleged, the court reasoned that an effect could 
still be direct even when there is a complex manufacturing process. Id. The court focused on the changes 
in the effects on U.S. commerce from the beginning of the alleged anticompetitive conduct to the end 
of the defendant’s alleged anticompetitive conduct. Id. The court stated that “because the effect of 
defendants’ anticompetitive conduct did not change significantly between the beginning of the process 
(overcharges for LCD panels) and the end (overcharges for televisions, monitors, and notebook 
computers), the effect proceeded without deviation or interruption from the LCD manufacturer to the 
American retail store.” Id. Even though the court did conclude that the domestic effects exception was 
met, its endorsement of LSL’s definition of direct remains problematic. See infra Part V.
85. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 848.
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countries such as China, Brazil, and India, and used those prices as benchmarks for 
sales in U.S. markets.88 As a result, the price of potash in the United States increased 
600%; a strong indication of anticompetitive conduct.89 The district court concluded 
that there was a sufficient “nexus” between the anticompetitive conduct in the foreign 
countries and the price increase in the United States.90 A Seventh Circuit panel 
reversed the district court and upheld the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs’ allegations about benchmarked prices did not demonstrate 
a “strong enough” relationship with domestic potash sales to establish a “direct” 
effect.91 In an en banc rehearing, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court and 
held that the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception was met.92
 The court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s borrowed interpretation of “direct” from 
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.93 The court explained that a critical distinction 
between the FSIA at issue in Weltover and the FTAIA was the presence of additional 
qualifiers: the FSIA does not use concepts of “substantiality” and “foreseeability” 
and the FTAIA expressly does.94 This distinction, the court reasoned, was crucial in 
understanding the meaning of “direct” under the FTAIA, because “superimposing 
the idea of an ‘immediate consequence’ results in a stricter test than the complete 
text of the [FTAIA] can bear.”95
 The Seventh Circuit adopted a broader standard. The court borrowed its 
interpretation of “direct” from the Department of Justice, which defined “direct” to 
mean a “reasonably proximate causal nexus” between conduct and effect.96 The court 
found support for this interpretation by analogizing the tort law principle of proximate 
cause. The court reasoned that a “reasonably proximate causal nexus” standard supports 
the plain language and purpose of the FTAIA because it limits liability where the 
connection between the conduct and the effect is too attenuated.97 The court stated, 
“Just as tort law cuts off recovery for those whose injuries are too remote from the cause 
of an injury, so does the FTAIA exclude from the Sherman Act foreign activities that 
are too remote from the ultimate effects on U.S domestic or import commerce.”98
88. Id. at 849. 
89. Id. 
90. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 667 F. Supp. 2d 907, 926–27 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
91. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 657 F.3d 650, 662 (7th Cir. 2011).
92. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 861.
93. Id. at 857.
94. Id. (“Critically, the Supreme Court in Weltover reached its definition of ‘direct’ for FSIA purposes only 
after refusing to import from the legislative history of that statue the notion that an effect is ‘direct’ only 
if it is both ‘substantial’ and ‘foreseeable.’”).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 856–57.
97. See id. at 857–58.
98. Id. The court found that this interpretation was consistent with the Supreme Court’s most recent 
confrontation with the FTAIA in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), which 
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 Applying this “remoteness” standard, the court found that the alleged supply 
restrictions in the foreign markets, which resulted in benchmark pricing for U.S. imports, 
were a direct cause of the resulting price increases in the United States.99 The court 
concluded: “It is no stretch to say that the foreign supply restrictions, and the concomitant 
price increases forced upon the Chinese producers, were a direct—that is, proximate 
cause of the subsequent price increases in the United States.” The Seventh Circuit 
therefore held that the requirements of the domestic effects exception were met.100
 C. The Problem with Both Approaches
 The two approaches above provide strikingly different standards for limiting the 
reach of U.S. antitrust law under the FTAIA. While both approaches are guided by 
a concern for limiting liability when anticompetitive conduct does not have a 
sufficient effect on U.S. domestic commerce, the critical difference is how the courts 
have chosen to cut off this liability. On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit was primarily 
concerned with the speculative nature of the growth of long-shelf-life tomato seeds 
and the corresponding effect the “lack of growth” would have on competition in the 
U.S. market.101 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit was less concerned with 
“immediacy” or “speculation” and more focused on a form of logical causation. This 
causation centered on whether the alleged supply reductions of potash and resulting 
price increases were too “remote” to have an effect in the United States.102 Although 
both interpretations may have led to reasonable conclusions under the facts of these 
specific cases, the precise meaning of “direct” remains unclear in light of the other 
elements of the domestic effects exception. To some extent, both definitions leave 
some important questions unanswered.
adopted a stricter causation standard under the second requirement of the FTAIA. In Empagran, foreign 
and domestic purchasers of vitamins filed an action against vitamin suppliers in the United States alleging 
that they had entered into a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 159. The foreign 
purchasers had alleged that, but for supracompetitive vitamin prices in the United States, they would not 
have suffered an antitrust injury on their foreign purchasers. Id. at 175. The idea being that, had the U.S. 
prices not been implicated, the foreign purchasers could have pursued an arbitrage theory, purchasing the 
vitamins at lower prices in the United States and then exporting and selling them back in their respective 
country. The Empagran court held that foreign purchasers failed to establish that the domestic effect to U.S. 
commerce “gave rise” to its Sherman Act claim because an independent foreign injury was insufficient to 
satisfy the causation requirement under the second prong of the FTAIA. Id. at 155.
99. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 859.
100. Id. at 860–61.
101. LSL, 379 F.3d at 680 (“We find no express allegation that Hazera has actually produced a modified 
seed that can be successfully grown in North America for long-shelf-life winter tomatoes. In sum, the 
record reveals that such seeds do not yet exist and the prospect of Hazera developing seeds . . . is at best 
speculative.”).
102. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 859.
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  1. The Problem with the Ninth Circuit’s Approach
 First, the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on the lack of “immediacy” between the 
speculative nature of the tomato seeds and the resulting anticompetitive effects in the 
United States leaves an important question unexamined: If the government had been 
able show that Hazera’s innovation in the growth of long-shelf-life tomato seeds was 
certain, would the Ninth Circuit’s standard of “immediate consequence” still have been 
a barrier to finding liability under the FTAIA? Certainly, the relevant market in the 
United States was fresh winter tomatoes, but the alleged anticompetitive conduct was 
the restriction on growing tomato seeds, not the related tomatoes. So then, does it 
follow that a restraint on growing long-shelf-life tomato seeds does not have an 
immediate effect on the tomato market in the United States? The district court in LSL 
adopted this precise reasoning. The district court determined that a tomato seed is 
related to, but not the same thing as, a tomato.103 As a result, the district court held 
that there was no “direct” effect on the U.S. winter tomato market.104
 In a leading antitrust treatise, law professors Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert 
Hovenkamp offer a compelling reason why the LSL formulation of “direct” is generally 
incongruent with U.S. antitrust law.105 The treatise states that “[t]he majority found 
indirectness by noting that the agreement operated to restrain the development of 
seeds for long-shelf-life tomatoes; it did not operate to restrain the sale of seeds that 
already existed.”106 The authors argue that agreements restricting a competitor’s ability 
to invest in research and development can be even more anticompetitive than a 
restriction on the production of an existing commodity.107 The authors further suggest 
that a macro view of the economy, which appears to be a logical perspective when 
analyzing competition law in international markets,108 shows that most restraints are 
on “intermediate goods.”109 Thus, LSL’s stringent standard, which requires an 
“immediate” nexus between the actor’s anticompetitive conduct and the resulting 
domestic effect, reflects the narrowness of the court’s opinion. Fundamentally, the 
103. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., No. 00CV529, 2002 WL 31115336, at *5–6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 
28, 2002).
104. Id. at *5. 
105. Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 14, ¶ 272. 
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Paul Hofer et al., Principles of Competition Policy Economics, Asia Pac. Antitrust Rev., 2004, at 4, 
available at http://www.nera.com/extImage/03Economicssjc4-7.pdf (“As markets globalise, competition 
policy is spreading as well . . . . As a result, no serious evaluation of difficult competition policy questions 
can be undertaken without an understanding of the relevant economics of ‘how markets work.’”). But see 
Alan Delvin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y. 558, 604 (2010) 
(claiming that “the fundamental tenets of microeconomics that underlie modern U.S. antitrust 
jurisprudence remain unscathed”).
109. Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 14, ¶ 272 (“Under the majority’s reading, an agreement involving 
United States and foreign automobile companies preventing the foreign companies from developing 
fuel-efficient automobile engines would be an ‘indirect’ restraint . . . . [T]his seems to be a rather myopic 
view of how research and distribution works in the economy.”).
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court’s “immediate consequence” standard ignores the appropriate economic and 
business considerations in international antitrust law cases.110
  2. The Problem with the Seventh Circuit’s Approach
 Does the Seventh Circuit’s definition solve the problem found in LSL? On some 
level, a “reasonably proximate causal nexus” standard is even more problematic than 
the “immediate consequence” approach. The Seventh Circuit’s standard finds no 
support in any Supreme Court precedent, let alone in the historical analysis of the 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law.111 Perhaps that is why the Seventh Circuit 
in Minn-Chem had difficulty applying the “reasonably proximate causal nexus” 
standard to the facts in that case. In Minn-Chem, the court summarily discussed the 
chain of events—negotiated prices, supply reductions, price increases, and then 
benchmark prices affecting U.S. consumers—but did not explain how this chain of 
events met the “reasonably proximate causal nexus” standard. Instead, the court 
concluded that it was “no stretch” that the alleged foreign conduct was the proximate 
cause of the price increases in the United States.112 But Congress did not ask whether 
the effect is a “stretch” from the conduct. While the court may have used “stretch” as 
a shorthand phrase, it leaves future courts with the difficulty of applying an otherwise 
amorphous standard.
iV. prOpOsaL fOr a nEW standard
 A. The Intersection Between Tort Law and Antitrust Law
 Tort law and antitrust law have a long and pervasive history in U.S. 
jurisprudence.113 What is less ubiquitous, however, is the intersection of these bodies 
of law. Although antitrust law has developed through many common law doctrines, 
the reliance on specific tort law principles has been less notable.114 Recently, however, 
Professor Michael Carrier explored principles of tort law, and argued for a tort-based 
framework for causation in the context of proving antitrust injury and determining 
causation in domestic monopolization cases.115
110. See Am. Bar. Ass’n, Antitrust Law Developments 1151 (Jonathan I. Gleklen et al. eds., 7th ed. 
2012) (“[T]he international dimension of economic activity sometimes calls for the application of 
special substantive rules not appropriate in the purely domestic context.”).
111. For a historical analysis of case law, antitrust reports, and congressional history of the extraterritorial 
reach of U.S. antitrust law before the enactment of the FTAIA, see Judge Aldisert’s dissent in United 
States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., 379 F.3d 672, 684–96 (9th Cir. 2004) (providing an extensive analysis 
of the history of the extraterritoriality of U.S antitrust law before the FTAIA). 
112. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2012).
113. See Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference 
Law, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1097, 1098 (1993). 
114. Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other, 121 
Yale L.J. 2216, 2233 (2012) (“[A]ntitrust law owes many of its most prominent features to common law 
methods of development . . . . Both tort and contract remedies presented problems, however.”).
115. Carrier, supra note 17, at 425.
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 Carrier argued that tort law causation principles like “cause in fact” and “legal 
cause” could prove helpful in analyzing whether certain domestic anticompetitive 
behavior, such as monopolization, “caused” the type of injury that antitrust law was 
intended to prevent.116 Carrier then provides a burden-shifting framework that would 
improve the monopolization analysis, and argues that antitrust plaintiffs should have 
a remedy, even where other market forces may have contributed to their injury.117
 Similarly, this note uses the well-understood theories of tort law to clarify the 
necessary link between foreign conduct and anticompetitive effects on U.S. commerce, 
especially where the definition of “direct” under the FTAIA currently lacks uniformity 
in the courts.118 The meaning of “direct” under the FTAIA should derive from tort 
law causation principles that limit liability by determining the appropriate scope of a 
defendant’s liability.119 One such principle is the scope of risk standard. The scope of 
risk standard limits an actor’s liability to a set of harms risked by the actor’s conduct.120 
Applying the scope of risk standard to the “direct” requirement will further Congress’s 
desire to have a straightforward, objective way of determining directness under the 
FTAIA.121
 Some legal practitioners caution that, in an increasingly interconnected global 
economy, an expansive interpretation of the domestic effects exception would likely 
open U.S. courts to a f lood of lawsuits, because a large number of foreign transactions 
ultimately have some effect on U.S. commerce.122 The scope of risk standard 
addresses this concern by limiting liability when the alleged effect on U.S. commerce 
is outside the risks created by the foreign actor’s conduct. Furthermore, the scope of 
risk standard balances the need to carefully apply U.S. antitrust law to foreign 
116. Id. at 408. 
117. Id. at 414–26.
118. See generally id. (addressing two types of causation principles in tort law: factual cause and legal cause). 
While this note will also focus on the application of tort law principles to U.S. antitrust law, it will 
address a narrower issue that has been plaguing the courts: the relationship between a foreign 
competitor’s conduct and an alleged anticompetitive effect on U.S. import commerce as understood 
under the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception. This note does not, however, address whether a plaintiff 
who successfully alleges a domestic effect would be able to prove an injury that the antitrust laws were 
meant to protect.
119. Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 198.
120. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 (2010) 
(describing the effect of applying the scope of risk standard, stating that “an actor’s liability is limited to 
those physical harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”).
121. FTAIA Report, supra note 28, at 2487.
122. Simmons & Patel, supra note 4, at 72. Others have noted that opponents to the f loodgate theory have 
meritorious arguments too. They argue that the FTAIA expressly requires that any effect on U.S. 
commerce must be substantial. Because of this substantiality requirement, legal commentators feel 
“confident that only the most egregious of cases—those that have a substantial effect on the U.S. 
economy—will thus be allowed in federal court.” Thomas Köster & H. Harrison Wheeler, Appellate 
Courts Split on the Interpretation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Should the Floodgates Be 
Opened?, 14 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 717, 727 (2004).
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conduct against the need to maintain the powerful deterrent effect of these laws.123 
Because the scope of risk standard derives from proximate cause principles, a 
discussion of the proximate cause doctrine is warranted.
 The general purpose of the proximate cause doctrine is to limit the liability under 
a particular substantive law.124 Under this premise, a wrongdoer should not be held 
liable for any harm, even if it is foreseeable, unless the risks associated with the harm 
offend the policies of the law under which the actor is being held accountable.125 
Because the domestic effects exception expressly incorporates the concept of 
“foreseeability,” analyzing the FTAIA by using principles of proximate cause is apt.126
 Most important, courts have already used the proximate cause analysis in other 
antitrust settings.127 For example, when faced with antitrust standing issues under 
the Clayton Act,128 some courts have used the proximate cause analysis to determine 
the causal link between the alleged injury and the remedy afforded under the 
statute.129 Similar to its use under the Clayton Act, proximate cause analysis under 
the FTAIA will allow courts to protect competition and deter wrongdoers from 
violating U.S. antitrust laws, while denying recovery to those harms which fall 
outside the ambit of the FTAIA. Proximate cause analysis has also been useful in 
interpreting other provisions of the FTAIA. For example, courts have used the 
proximate cause analysis to determine whether the effect on U.S. commerce “gives 
rise” to a conspiracy claim under the Sherman Act.130 For these reasons, proximate 
123. Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act: Do We Really Want to Return to American 
Banana?, 65 Me. L. Rev. 3, 19 (2012) (comparing decisions that ref lect a “substantive shift away from 
vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws and towards greater permissiveness of defendants’ 
anticompetitive behavior”). 
124. William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1450–51 (1985) 
(“[Proximate cause] is concerned with when to deny recovery to those actually injured by a defendant’s 
conduct for reasons derived from the policies that underlie the applicable substantive rules.”).
125. See id. 
126. Notions of foreseeability play a vital role in proximate cause analysis. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 
Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928); Carrier, supra note 17. Professor Carrier recognizes the crossroad between tort 
law and antitrust law when dealing with notions of factual causation: “[T]ort law tests the connection 
between the breach of a duty and a plaintiff ’s harm, and antitrust doctrine focuses on the link between 
challenged conduct and anticompetitive effect.” Id. at 1004.
127. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199–201 (9th Cir. 1973); Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir. 1964); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry 
Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962).  
128. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2012). The Clayton Act governs standing and damages in antitrust lawsuits.
129. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (“In the absence of direct guidance from 
Congress, and faced with the claim that a particular injury is too remote from the alleged violation to 
warrant § 4 standing, the courts are thus forced to resort to an analysis no less elusive than that employed 
traditionally by courts at common law with respect to the matter of ‘proximate cause.’”); see also Max 
Huffman, A Standing Framework for Private Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement, 60 SMU L. Rev. 
103, 107 (2007) (recognizing that one of the primary limitations in antitrust standing is the idea of 
proximate cause).
130. The FTAIA provides a two-step causation framework. This article focuses on step one (the domestic 
effects exception), which inquires whether some alleged foreign conduct caused an effect on U.S. import 
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cause, and more specifically the scope of risk doctrine, should be applied to antitrust 
cases implicating the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception.131
 Courts have long used proximate cause to limit an actor’s liability based on principles 
of public policy.132 An illustrative example is the famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Rail Road Co., where Justice Andrews articulated why the common law cuts off liability 
even when there are harms that may have been caused by a particular act:
What we mean by the word “proximate” is, that because of convenience, of 
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace 
series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics. 
. . . We regret that the line was drawn just where it was, but drawn somewhere 
it had to be. We said the act of the railroad was not the proximate cause of 
our neighbor’s fire. Cause it surely was. The words we used were simply 
indicative of our notions of public policy. But somewhere they reach the point 
where they cannot say the streams come from any one source.133
 In some sense, Justice Andrews foreshadowed what would be a recurring issue 
not only in tort law, but also in other areas of law where the scope of liability question 
is critical. Today, courts regularly engage in proximate cause analysis when 
determining the scope of liability for a particular harm.134 To be sure, proximate 
cause analysis has its shortcomings.135 Analyzing proximate cause is often problematic 
commerce. Step two asks a very different question: whether the U.S. effect (once established in step one) 
has caused an injury that the Sherman Act was meant to redress. See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F. 
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the direct effect must 
proximately cause the claimed injuries); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust 
Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); In re Monosodium Glutamate (MSG) Antitrust Litig., 
477 F.3d 535, 539 (8th Cir. 2007) (same). Because “the proximate cause standard is consistent with 
general antitrust principles, which typically require a direct causal link between the anticompetitive 
practice and plaintiff ’s damages,” a proximate cause, rather than but-for, standard is proper. DRAM, 
546 F.3d at 988.
131. See Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 198 n.6 (“[s]cope of liability limitations are fundamental and can 
apply in any kind of case in which damages must be proven, not merely in negligence cases.”). Because 
concepts of proximate cause and scope of risk are policy-driven doctrines, they have found their place in 
multiple areas of the law, such as contracts, torts, and civil rights. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (contracts case); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (civil rights case); Gibson 
v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) (constitutional case); Baylor v. United States, 
407 A.2d 664 (D.C. 1979) (criminal case).
132. McCready, 457 U.S. at 495 n.13.
133. 248 N.Y. 339, 352–53 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
134. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Forms & Functions of Tort Law 103, 124 (3d ed. 2007); 
Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 198; W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 43, at 281 (5th ed. 1984).
135. Carrier, supra note 17, at 415 (“To be sure, causation analysis is not the same in every jurisdiction, and 
concepts like proximate cause often are unclear.”); see also McCready, 457 U.S. at 476–78 n.13 (“And the 
use of such terms only emphasizes that the principle of proximate cause is hardly a rigorous analytic 
tool.”). Indeed the Restatement of Torts suggests that the precise terminology of proximate cause, at 
least in the context of negligence cases, is not universal. The Restatement of Torts opposes the use of the 
phrase “proximate cause” because the term does not accurately ref lect the idea of a limitation of liability. 
Instead, the Restatement advocates a “scope of liability” term, which focuses on that idea that tort law 
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because the justifications for determining when to limit liability are given different 
weight based on various considerations.136 These considerations include fairness, 
foreseeability, logic, and past experience. As a result, courts often disagree about 
which considerations are most important in a proximate cause analysis.137 Justice 
Andrews elucidated a few legal standards that are helpful in resolving the uncertainty 
in a proximate cause analysis. First, a court could ask whether “there was a natural 
and continuous sequence between cause and effect.”138 Second, a court may inquire 
whether “by the exercise of prudent foresight[,] could the result be foreseen?”139 
Third, a court could ask whether the “result [is] too remote from the cause, and . . . 
consider remoteness in time and space.”140 Fourth, a court may look to see if there 
was a “direct connection between [cause and effect], without too many intervening 
causes.”141 Lastly, a court may ask whether one was “a substantial factor in producing 
the other.”142 Despite the different facts that would be relevant to each of these 
considerations, one thing remains clear: in all of these various standards, a practical 
judgment grounded in fairness is being made to limit a wrongdoer’s liability.
draws a line on when to impose liability, even when the actor may have, in fact, caused the resulting 
harm. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 6 
(2010). Dobbs concurs with this terminology. See Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 198. 
136. “[Proximate cause is] an instrument of fairness and policy, although the conclusion is frequently 
expressed in the confusing language of causation, ‘foreseeability’ and ‘natural and probable consequences’ 
. . . . The determination of proximate cause by a court is to be based upon mixed considerations of logic, 
common sense, justice, policy and precedent.” Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 635 
(1996) (citation omitted); Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Harper, James 
& Gray on Torts § 18.8 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining that proximate cause “prevents clarity of thought 
and meaningful analysis”).
137. Joseph A. Page, Torts: Proximate Cause 18–25 (2003) (explaining that courts employ a variety of 
proximate cause tests). The Restatement Third of Torts comments that notions of “substantiality” and 
“foreseeability” are inquiries that have often been ingrained in a proximate cause analysis. These notions 
generally provide a basis for assisting a judge on when to limit an actor’s liability. At the same time, the 
Restatement vehemently opposes the use of “geography” and “time” to describe or define proximate 
cause. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 
cmt. j (2010).
138. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y.2d at 354; see also Page, supra note 137, at 50. Criticism of this formulation is 
commonplace. Indeed, the Restatement contends that “[o]ne major problem with the ‘natural and 
continuous’ language is that it fails to confront the essential concern of the proximate-cause limitation: 
actors should not be held liable when the risk-producing aspects of their conduct cause harm other than 
that which was risked by the tortious conduct.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 cmt. b (2010).
139. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y.2d at 354.
140. Id.; see also Keeton, supra note 16, at 42 (“A consequence is not too remote if it is direct.”). While Justice 
Andrews may be correct in arguing that time and space are relevant under a remoteness inquiry, the 
Restatement makes an important clarification: in many cases there will be more than one proximate or 
legal cause. On that premise, an actor’s harmful conduct need not be close in time or space to the 
plaintiff ’s harm to be a proximate or legal cause. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 cmt. b (2010). 
141. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y.2d at 354.
142. Id.
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 Shifting these concepts to antitrust policy, Congress decided to limit liability in 
international antitrust cases by using the FTAIA as the central mechanism.143 The 
FTAIA is at the forefront of Congress’s policy to protect competition in the United 
States while ensuring that U.S. antitrust laws reach only foreign conduct that affects 
U.S. import commerce.144 In considering this balance, Congress chose to limit 
liability to cases where there is a sufficient nexus between anticompetitive conduct 
and the resulting anticompetitive effects.145 To find this nexus, courts must conclude 
that the alleged conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” 
on U.S. import commerce.146 Congress, however, failed to discuss two essential 
aspects of this nexus requirement. First, Congress did not explicitly define what each 
individual term of this requirement means.147 Second, and perhaps more crucial, 
Congress did not explicitly address whether each individual requirement of the 
domestic effects exception must be analyzed before finding that the exception has 
been met.148 As a result, some courts have considered the domestic effects exception 
conceptually but have failed to interpret what each individual requirement means.149 
Other courts have left some individual requirements out of their analysis entirely.150 
Ignoring that each individual requirement must be satisfied grants courts more 
discretion than Congress intended. Put another way, courts must apply each 
requirement to the facts to determine whether an effect on U.S. commerce is one 
that the FTAIA was meant to reach. Otherwise, courts will continue to conflate the 
relevant factual considerations for “directness” with the separate factual considerations 
for “reasonable foreseeability” and “substantiality,” two concepts frequently analyzed 
under proximate cause.151
143. See supra Part II.
144. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004). (“[C]ourts have long held that 
application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable, and hence 
with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as they ref lect a legislative effort to redress domestic 
antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused.”); see also Huffman, supra note 15, at 
306 (discussing Congress’s protectionist approach in preferring U.S. businesses and consumers over 
foreign businesses and consumers).
145. Edward D. Cavanaugh, The FTAIA and Empagran: What Next?, 58 SMU L. Rev. 1419, 1442 (2005).
146. Id. at 1424; 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012). 
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
148. See id.
149. CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D.N.J. 2006) (discussing the “domestic effects” 
exception and relying on Hartford Fire to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claim under the FTAIA).
150. El Cid, Ltd. v. N.J. Zinc Co., 551 F. Supp. 626, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)  (concluding that the effect on 
foreign commerce need not be both substantial and direct).
151. The prevailing approach to the limit of liability issue under a proximate cause analysis is foreseeability. 
See, e.g., Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 198 (“The most general and pervasive approach to . . . proximate 
cause holds that a negligent defendant is liable for all the general kinds of harms he foreseeably risked by 
his negligent conduct and to the class of persons he put at risk by that conduct.”). In some cases, 
substantiality is also a factor:
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 To illustrate, consider the hypothetical posed in Part I of this note. In summary, 
suppose that a group of foreign manufacturers conspire to fix the price of inputs by 
reducing their output sold to other foreign manufacturers. These inputs are then 
refined into finished goods sold at supracompetitive prices in the United States. Does 
this foreign conduct have a “direct effect” on U.S. commerce under the FTAIA? The 
outcome under the “reasonable proximate causal nexus” standard will depend on the 
strength of the nexus between the markets for the inputs and the markets for the 
finished goods. In some instances, this inquiry will be straightforward—if the input 
is a major component of the final product, any supracompetitive pricing in the foreign 
market will generally have a reasonable proximate causal nexus to the inflated prices 
of the finished goods in the United States.152
 But in other instances, the inquiry may be more difficult. If foreign manufacturers 
of major component parts conspire to increase prices “directly” in foreign markets and 
such conduct results in unintended ripple effects on the prices of finished goods in the 
United States, the “reasonable proximate causal nexus” standard might capture more 
conduct than necessary.153 This is true even if the foreign manufacturers could reasonably 
foresee the anticompetitive effects of their behavior and even if the effects on U.S. 
markets are substantial, because their conduct must “directly” cause these effects.
 Under the “immediate consequence” standard, surely it could be argued that the 
higher-priced finished goods and the concomitant anticompetitive effect on U.S. 
markets depended on uncertain intervening transactions. That is, once the input or 
component part leaves the hands of the alleged conspirator, intervening steps in the 
ordinary chain of production may affect the finished good.154 Similarly, other factors 
like general market conditions, financing costs, economic forces of supply and 
demand, and geopolitical instabilities are all intervening events that could contribute 
to the resulting anticompetitive effect on U.S. markets.
 But if all of that were true, then any alleged foreign anticompetitive conduct 
involving inputs manufactured on a global scale would always fail the “direct” 
In the past, we have said that harm is ‘proximate’ in a legal sense if prudent human 
foresight would lead one to expect that similar harm is likely to be substantially caused 
by the specific act or omission in question. In other words, human experience teaches 
that the same harm can be expected to recur if the same act or omission is repeated in a 
similar context.
 McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992). 
152. Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., No. 12 Civ. 7465(SAS), 2013 WL 2099227, at *10 
(S.D.N.Y May 14, 2013) (distinguishing In re TFT-LCD on the grounds that, in that case the effects 
from increasing the component parts, which were a major component of the final product sold in the 
United States, were easily quantifiable).
153. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561 (D. Del. 2006) (quoting 
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
154. See In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2011). In this case, defendants 
argued that, because the manufacturing process for LCD products contained a complex production 
chain that involved multiple sales before the end product reached the United States, the U.S. economy 
was not “directly affected” by the alleged conspiracy. Id. at 962.
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requirement, an overly narrow result Congress did not intend.155 This is true for at 
least three reasons. First, natural market forces and economic conditions of supply 
and demand, by definition, are not intervening causes because they operate 
independently from any anticompetitive conduct that takes place.156 Second, spillover 
and ripple effects, while understandably part of the FTAIA equation, are not 
appropriately analyzed under the “direct” requirement because they relate to the 
quantitative effect on U.S. markets.157 Therefore, these effects should be analyzed 
under the substantiality requirement. In this way, courts may appropriately focus on 
the economic relationship between anticompetitive behavior and the quantification 
of the resulting anticompetitive effects.158 Third, defining “direct” as an “immediate 
consequence” makes the domestic effects exception superfluous, because the FTAIA 
expressly exempts import commerce from scrutiny under its prefatory language. Not 
only does it make it superf luous, but it also is irreconcilable with the import 
commerce exception of the FTAIA, which already controls direct import commerce. 
In other words, if a foreign manufacturer sells a product to a U.S. domestic purchaser 
directly—undeniably import commerce—any alleged effect on the United States 
155. At least one law professor has supported this proposition. See Huffman, supra note 15, at 347 n.353 (“[A]
lthough a domestic plaintiff purchasing in a foreign market may not be suffering harm due to a domestic 
effect, if that same plaintiff is purchasing an input for use in a domestic manufacturing operation, the 
situation might be different.”); see also In re TFT-LCD, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 963–64 (“At bottom, 
defendants’ proposed definition of ‘direct effect’ is too narrow . . . adopting a definition of ‘direct’ under 
which only the first sale of a product could satisfy the standard would exclude from the Sherman Act’s 
reach a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct that has real consequences for American 
consumers.”). But see United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (N.D. 
Ill. 2001), aff ’d, 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“The FTAIA explicitly bars antitrust actions 
alleging restraints in foreign markets for inputs . . . that are used abroad to manufacture downstream 
products . . . but may later be imported into the United States.”) (citation omitted).
156.  See Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 204 (“An intervening cause is a new cause that comes into play after 
the defendant’s negligent conduct. If the intervening force is in operation at the time the defendant 
acted, it is not an intervening cause at all.”). This observation is premised on the notion that the cartel 
did not artificially create these market conditions through their market power; instead they were 
independently in operation during the cartel’s anticompetitive conduct. See Hofer et al., supra note 108, 
at 6 (“Modern quantitative techniques and empirical econometric methods allow sophisticated analyses 
of cartel effects, while controlling for changes in the market that may also have had an effect on prices 
but were independent of the cartel (e.g., an increase in demand).”).
157. The legislative history supports this conclusion. See FTAIA Report, supra note 28, at 2498 (“[I]f a 
domestic export cartel were so strong as to have a spillover effect on commerce within this country by 
creating a world-wide shortage or artificially inf lated world-wide price that had the effect of raising 
domestic prices—the cartel’s conduct would fall within the reach of our antitrust laws.”); see In re Intel, 
452 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (reasoning that “ripple effects” were insufficient to provide a remedy under the 
FTAIA, because AMD’s allegation of a world-wide market did not create jurisdiction with “substantial 
direct, effects on the domestic market”).
158. Compare Huffman, supra note 15, at 317–18 (recognizing that pre-FTAIA case law has stood for the 
proposition that a “sufficient magnitude of effect can be a proxy for directness”), with Delrahim, supra 
note 37, at 430 (suggesting that nothing in the legislative history nor the language of the FTAIA 
supports a reading that “direct” and “substantiality” should be considered disjunctively because “[the 
FTAIA] imposes three separate requirements for the Sherman Act to reach foreign conduct”).
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would surely be an immediate consequence of the foreign manufacturer’s alleged 
anticompetitive conduct.159
 B. Scope of Risk Standard as a Solution
 The solution to these competing approaches has two components. First, the 
proper interpretation of “direct” under the FTAIA is a limitation of liability grounded 
in a scope of risk analysis. Second, courts must analyze the factual allegations of 
“directness” independently of the other requirements of the domestic effects exception 
(i.e., “substantiality” and “reasonable foreseeability”). Borrowing from well-explored 
definitions of proximate cause under tort law, “direct” should be understood as an 
independent limitation on liability that focuses on the logical relationship between 
conduct and effect. In this way, liability will be limited to anticompetitive conduct 
that results from the risks that made the conduct anticompetitive in the first place. 
Focusing on the actor’s risks seems logical because the FTAIA already considers the 
actor’s expectations under the “reasonable foreseeability” requirement and the amount 
of harm to competition under the “substantiality” requirement.160
 For example, the scope of risk standard in tort law limits liability to only those 
harms that result from risks created by the actor’s wrongful conduct.161 Generally, 
this requires considering whether the harm for which recovery is sought resulted 
from any of those risks.162 Professor Dan B. Dobbs offers an extreme but clear 
example of the scope of risk analysis in a negligence action:
[S]uppose that a surgeon negligently performs a vasectomy. Because the 
surgery was negligently performed, the patient fathers a child. The child, at 
the age of 13, sets fire to the plaintiff ’s barn. Is the surgeon liable for the loss 
of the barn? He was negligent in performing the vasectomy, and his negligence 
is a factual cause of the fire and the loss of the barn. Almost everyone will 
agree, however, that while the surgeon might be liable for something, he is 
surely not liable for loss of the plaintiff ’s barn. Courts are likely in such a case 
to say that the surgeon’s negligence is not a proximate cause of the harm done, 
by which they mean that the harm was not within the scope of risks the 
defendant created. The risk he created was that the child’s father would have 
a child against his wishes, but not that the child would be more likely than 
other children to set fire to barns.163
159. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To demand a foreseeable, 
substantial, and ‘immediate’ consequence on import or domestic commerce comes close to ignoring the 
fact that straightforward import commerce has already been excluded from the FTAIA’s coverage.”).
160. Keeton,  supra note 16, at 41 (“[W]hether consciously or subconsciously, a concept of risk is almost 
exclusively, if not exactly so, the determinant of directness and concurrence.”).
161. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 cmt. e 
(2010).
162. See id.
163. Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 198.
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 By analogy, under the FTAIA, the scope of risk standard would impose liability 
for only those anticompetitive effects that result from risks created by the alleged 
foreign actor’s anticompetitive conduct.164 This analysis is already implicit in a 
hypothetical discussed by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission in their antitrust enforcement guidelines (the “Guidelines”).165 In 
relevant part, the Guidelines posit the following scenario:
[T]he foreign cartel produces a product in several foreign countries. None of 
its members have any U.S. production, nor do any of them have U.S. 
subsidiaries. They organize a cartel for the purpose of raising the price of the 
product in question. Rather than selling directly into the United States, 
however, the cartel sells to an intermediary outside the United States, which 
they know will resell the product in the United States. The intermediary is 
not part of the cartel.166
 Here, the Guidelines limit the jurisdictional analysis to whether the “potential 
harm that would ensue if the conspiracy [i.e., the illegal agreement] were successful, 
not on whether the actual conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy had in fact the 
prohibited effect upon interstate or foreign commerce.”167 In other words, the central 
inquiry is whether the anticompetitive effect on U.S. markets is within the scope of 
the risks created only by the illegal anticompetitive agreement. This limited inquiry 
into the “anticompetitive agreement” does not concern itself with any future conduct 
by either the principal actors or any intermediaries in the chain of production. Nor 
does it compensate for any future intervening market forces or regulatory matters that 
could affect the execution of the agreement. Instead, as the scope of risk standard 
suggests, the inquiry focuses only on the range of harms risked under the initial 
agreement. While the Guidelines acknowledge that, under this scenario, the domestic 
effects exception would be met,168 it is evident that the other factors of the exception—
“reasonable foreseeability” and “substantiality”—must also be present. In short, the 
long-standing U.S. antitrust enforcement guidelines have implicitly adopted a scope 
of risk analysis that is supported by the purpose and plain language of the FTAIA.169
 Using the scope of risk standard would not require courts to delve into other aspects 
of proximate cause often inherent in tort law cases such as the type and extent of harm 
caused by the actor’s conduct. This is because the second section of the FTAIA 
164. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 cmt. d 
(2010) (“The magnitude of the risk is the severity of the harm discounted by the probability that it will 
occur.”).
165. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for 
International Operations § 3.12 (1995).
166. Id.
167. Id. By jurisdiction, of course, the Guidelines mean whether the conduct falls under the ambit of the 
FTAIA’s domestic effects exception. 
168. Id.
169. The Supreme Court reasoned that “the FTAIA’s language and history suggest that Congress designed the 
FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as 
applied to foreign commerce.” F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004).
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addresses whether the alleged anticompetitive effect “gives rise to” a claim covered 
under the substantive requirements of the Sherman Act.170 This second section would 
determine whether antitrust law considers the effect on U.S. commerce harmful. Thus, 
the scope of risk standard narrows the inquiry to whether the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct had a “direct” effect on U.S. commerce. This, of course, is possible only 
because the FTAIA expressly requires separate inquiries into the “substantiality” and 
“reasonable foreseeability” of the effect. Moreover, the FTAIA’s domestic effects 
exception, by definition, limits liability by providing jurisdiction only when there are 
anticompetitive—not procompetitive—effects on U.S. commerce. Put differently, the 
FTAIA is a self-contained limitation on the range of harms that can be redressed 
under U.S. antitrust laws, allowing courts to use the scope of risk standard without the 
difficulty found in tort law cases.
V.  bEnEfits Of thE sCOpE Of risK standard
 The scope of risk standard offers other analytical benefits. First, it is simple to 
apply. Courts can isolate the alleged foreign anticompetitive conduct and determine 
whether the alleged domestic effect falls under the range of harms risked by such 
conduct. This obviates the need for courts to inquire into other factors that may 
cause the effect because the scope of risk standard recognizes that an actor’s conduct 
need not be the only cause of the plaintiff ’s harm.171
 Second, by refining the directness analysis to focus only on the scope of risks 
created by the foreign conduct, courts will be less likely to conflate facts that are not 
supported by the appropriate consideration of “directness,” “reasonable foreseeability,” 
or “substantiality.” In other words, each respective consideration takes on its own 
analysis so that “reasonable foreseeability” does not determine “directness” and vice 
versa.172 This in turn eliminates the possibility of reaching an erroneous conclusion 
like in Intel, where the court deflected its attention from the relationship between 
the challenged foreign conduct and the U.S. domestic effect, and instead focused on 
other factors not relevant to the directness inquiry.173
170. In cases involving tort-based cause of actions, courts often discuss and evaluate the type of harms and 
extent of harm when determining whether to limit the liability of a defendant’s conduct. However, 
courts typically note that “the manner in which the harm occurs is irrelevant to scope of liability so long 
as the harm is foreseeable or within the risk standard.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability 
for Physical and Emotional Harm   § 29 cmt. o (2010). Because the FTAIA already requires 
foreseeability, the type-of-harm analysis should not be part of the equation.
171. See Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 208.
172. Courts have found liability in cases when the harm was not foreseeable, but was nevertheless “direct.” 
Keeton, supra note 16, at 44 (“Despite all the evidence we have marshaled for the proposition that the 
concept of reasonable foresight creeps into the criterion for determining whether causation is direct, the 
fact remains that some courts persistently declare that they will impose liability for direct causation even 
as to unforeseeable consequences.”).
173. See In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561 (D. Del. 2006) (“As 
explained by the Court previously, these types of effects are not direct domestic effects of any alleged 
foreign conduct of Intel, but secondary and indirect effects that are also the by-product of numerous 
factors relevant to market conditions and the like.”).
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 Third, the standard provides clear outer limits to the domestic effects exception.174 
In particular, the scope of risk standard focuses on the circumstances that existed at 
that time of the alleged anticompetitive conduct and the concomitant risks that were 
created by that conduct.175 At the same time, the scope of risk standard provides courts 
with the flexibility needed in FTAIA cases, where balancing concerns of prescriptive 
comity with the desire to protect U.S. markets from harmful anticompetitive conduct 
is imperative.176
 A. Applying the Scope of Risk Standard to the Hypothetical 
 Applying the scope of risk standard to the hypothetical posed in this note 
demonstrates its analytical benefits. As an initial matter, even if intervening factors, 
such as independent product decisions between the input and finished product 
manufacturers, contribute to the alleged effects on U.S. markets, a court should limit 
its focus to the alleged anticompetitive conduct. In this hypothetical, the alleged 
conduct in question is a deliberate output restriction of raw inputs marketed to 
intermediate companies. A court can examine whether a price increase on the end 
product was a concomitant harm that could result from this behavior. This examination 
would involve, among other things, a detailed evaluation of the challenged agreement 
between the cartel members to determine if this behavior has an adverse effect on 
competition in the relevant market.177
174. In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“To be sure, the ‘direct 
effect’ requirement places concrete limits on the ability of a plaintiff to invoke the federal antitrust laws.”).
175. Id. Unlike in Intel, the court in TFT-LCD rightly focused on the particular circumstances that existed at 
the time the alleged anticompetitive conduct took place and the corresponding risks that were created by 
that conduct. In effect, the court did not actually apply the immediate consequence approach, because if it 
did, then it would have reached the same conclusion that Intel reached, namely that there were “twists and 
turns” between the price increases in the component parts and the final end products. Id. at 964 (“Where, 
as here, the nature of the effect does not change in any substantial way before it reaches the United States 
consumer, the effect is an ‘immediate consequence’ of the defendant’s anticompetitive behavior.”). Instead, 
the TFT-LCD court isolated the foreign conduct and reasoned that, because the LCD products were a 
major component of the electronic products in the United States, there was no way to divorce the increased 
prices in the LCD market (the anticompetitive conduct) from the increase prices in the finished electronic 
products (the anticompetitive effect). Id. at 966. By the same token, the court could have analyzed the facts 
under the scope of risk standard and reached the same conclusion by reasoning that the increased U.S. 
prices of electronic products was a harm that resulted from the risks of price fixing the component LCDs 
in contravention of competition law. Had it adopted a scope of risk analysis, it could have avoided its 
attempt to clarify the Ninth Circuit’s formulation of “immediate consequence” and adding additional 
confusion to an already complex set of standards. 
176. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 29 cmt. e 
(2010) (“The risk standard appeals to intuitive notions of fairness and proportionality by limiting 
liability to harms that result from risks created by the actor’s wrongful conduct, but no others. It also 
provides sufficient f lexibility to accommodate fairness concerns raised by the specific facts of a case.”). 
177. See Morgenstern & Prystowsky, supra note 39, at ch. 26 (“The final step in a market analysis is to 
evaluate the challenged restraint’s future anticompetitive effects on the relevant market based on the 
market’s economic realities. Where there are sound ways to determine anticompetitive effects based on 
direct evidence (for example, by showing a casual link to an actual price increase), an antitrust plaintiff 
may meet the burden of producing evidence without conducting an elaborate market analysis.”).
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 If the answer to this inquiry is in the affirmative, then the “direct” standard 
would be met. By isolating this inquiry and focusing on the logical relationship 
between the foreign actor’s anticompetitive conduct and the resulting anticompetitive 
effect, a court can properly analyze issues of intervening developments, ripple effects, 
and other economic forces178 under the “reasonable foreseeability” and “substantiality” 
requirements.179 In addition, this standard provides several benefits over the current 
approaches adopted by the courts in LSL and Minn-Chem.
 B. Applying the Scope of Risk Standard to LSL and Minn-Chem
 Applying the scope of risk standard to LSL and Minn-Chem highlights the 
benefits of using a tort-based approach to understand the relationship between 
foreign conduct and any resulting effect on U.S. markets. Indeed, had the LSL and 
Minn-Chem courts interpreted “direct” as an inquiry into whether the alleged effect 
on U.S. markets was a result of the scope of risks created by the actor’s conduct, they 
would have reached a result more consistent with the purpose of the FTAIA.
 For example, in LSL, the majority hinged its analysis on the “speculative” nature 
of Hazera’s ability to grow its own version of long-shelf-life tomatoes.180 Specifically, 
the court parsed through the government’s pleading documents (which included a 
declaration from Hazera’s president that spoke in purely forward-looking terms) 
before determining that this uncertainty could not be a “direct” effect.181 The court 
concluded that “as a matter of common sense, regardless which of the many 
definitions of ‘direct’ one adopts, this fact is crucial to the ‘direct effects’ calculus.”182 
The court erroneously conf lated the facts, because the speculative nature of the 
conduct goes to the “reasonably foreseeable” inquiry and not to the “direct” 
requirement. In other words, the effect of increasing the price of tomatoes in the 
United States could not be foreseen from the agreement restricting Hazera from 
growing long-shelf-life tomato seeds because Hazera’s ability to sell the seeds was 
uncertain. Had the court focused on the relationship between the alleged 
anticompetitive agreement and the potential harms—in this case, a restraint on 
competition in the U.S. tomato market—it would have addressed its concerns about 
certainty under the appropriate “reasonable foreseeability” standard.183
178. Hofer et al., supra note 108, at 6. (“Modern quantitative techniques and empirical econometric methods 
allow sophisticated analyses of cartel effects, while controlling for changes in the market that may also 
have had an effect on prices but were independent of the cartel . . . .”). 
179. See Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 204 (“Such cases [namely, intervening acts and superseding causes] 
are simply subsets or particular examples of the basic scope of the risk problem and can be resolved 
under ordinary foreseeability rules . . . . However, the focus on temporal sequences in the superseding 
cause analysis tends to detract from the essential foreseeability analysis it purports to follow.”).
180. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, Inc., 379 F.3d 672, 681 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Delrahim, supra note 37, at 430 (suggesting that certainty does not fit in the “direct” analysis, largely 
because it would render the term “reasonably foreseeable” meaningless under the domestic effects exception). 
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 Similarly, in Minn-Chem, the court did not analyze the contours of the domestic 
effects exception. After defining the term “direct” as a “reasonable proximate causal 
nexus,” the court reasoned that the “alleged supply reductions led to price hikes in 
these foreign markets, and those increases showed up almost immediately in the prices 
of U.S. imports.”184 Immediacy—an element of time—was the standard adopted by 
the LSL court and precisely the same standard rejected in Minn-Chem.185 Despite 
this internal inconsistency, the court determined that other intervening forces, like 
effects by regulatory structures (which could insulate the potash market from 
potential price increases) would not be enough to dismiss the complaint.186 Impliedly, 
the court focused on the risks created by the cartel’s conduct and whether the effect 
on the U.S. market was a result of those risks. The court emphasized that the alleged 
foreign benchmark prices created by the defendant’s conduct was the direct cause of 
the price increase in the U.S. market.187 Under the scope of risk standard, it would be 
hard to argue that a price effect in the U.S. market was not a result of the risk created 
by setting benchmark prices in the market where the cartel was relatively free to 
operate.188 Thus, the Seventh Circuit could have reached the same conclusion using a 
scope of risk standard while avoiding any internal inconsistency.
Vi.  pUbLiC pOLiCY JUstifiCatiOns fOr thE sCOpE Of risK standard UndEr 
thE ftaia
 Strong policy reasons also support using the scope of risk standard. It is undisputed 
that the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws overlaps with our relations with 
foreign sovereigns.189 Indeed, the Supreme Court reinforced the importance of U.S. 
antitrust laws in redressing domestic antitrust injury caused by foreign anticompetitive 
conduct.190 While this may be true, Congress did not interject any notions of comity 
184. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). The court was 
correct to take issue with the “immediate consequence” standard. See Dobbs et al., supra note 17, § 208 
(“And the defendant’s misconduct is not too remote for liability merely because time or distance separates 
the defendant’s act from the plaintiff ’s harm.”) (citations omitted).
185. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 857–58.
186. Id. at 859.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Consideration of prescriptive comity involves balancing seven factors, which were outlined in Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977). The seven factors are: (1) the degree of conflict 
with foreign law or policy; (2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal 
places of businesses or corporations; (3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected 
to achieve compliance; (4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with 
those elsewhere; (5) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce; 
(6) the foreseeability of such effect; and (7) the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct 
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. Id. at 614.
190. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 172–74 (2004).
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in the domestic effects test.191 But the FTAIA does not prevent courts from using the 
doctrine of comity to limit U.S. jurisdiction over international antitrust claims.192 As 
a result, using the scope of risk standard—which provides greater clarity to the outer 
limits of the FTAIA—will ensure that U.S. laws do not “unreasonably interfere with 
the sovereign authority of other nations.”193
 The scope of risk standard accomplishes this in at least two ways. First, the scope of 
risk standard should limit liability in those cases where the alleged foreign conduct does 
not raise domestic antitrust concerns.194 This limitation is consistent with the Guidelines, 
which are not concerned with any effects on U.S. markets that increase competition. 
Second, the scope of risk standard should prevent any concern that a foreign company 
that does not create risks that could produce anticompetitive effects on U.S. markets 
would violate the Sherman Act by properly isolating the foreseeability and substantiality 
standards from the “direct” analysis.195 In sum, the scope of risk standard balances 
appropriate deterrence against inappropriate interference with foreign laws.
191. FTAIA Report, supra note 28, at 2488 (“If a court determines that the requirements for subject matter 
jurisdiction are met, this bill would have no effect on the courts’ ability to employ notions of comity . . . 
or otherwise to take account of the international character of the transactions.”).
192. See In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932 (9th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that because the FTAIA did 
not completely eliminate comity considerations,  a Timberlane  analysis was applicable to determine 
whether jurisdiction should be exercised), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded sub nom. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); McElderry v. Cathay Pac. Airways, 678 F. Supp. 1071, 
1078–80 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (declining jurisdiction on the basis of international comity in spite of a finding 
of sufficient anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce). Some courts have even decided issues of comity 
before even analyzing the FTAIA. See, e.g., In re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 777, 
783 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]he principles of comity identified in [Empagran, 542 U.S. 155] are central to 
the question of statutory interpretation . . . and counsel this Court away from an interpretation of the 
FTAIA that would permit Plaintiffs to adjudicate its claims of foreign injury . . . .”). 
193. See id. (concluding, after an examination of the FTAIA’s legislative history and the doctrine of comity, 
that this reading is consistent with congressional intent in enacting the statute).
194. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 165, ch. 3.121, 
illus. C (“[I]n the absence of an agreement with respect to the U.S. market, sales into the U.S. market 
at non-predatory levels do not raise antitrust concerns.”).
195. In re TFT-LCD Antitrust Litig., 822 F. Supp. 2d 953, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“In the Court’s view, the 
concern identified in  SRAM  is better addressed through the requirement that the anticompetitive 
effects of a defendants’ [sic] conduct on the United States be ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”) (citation omitted); 
In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-md-01819 CW, 2010 WL 
5477313, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2010) (holding that the plaintiff ’s evidence was insufficient to 
satisfy the second prong under the domestic effects exception, which requires that alleged conduct gives 
rise to the plaintiff ’s antitrust claims). In SRAM, the court was addressing the plaintiff ’s evidence that 
the SRAM products at issue were specifically designed to be sold to a particular manufacturer, to then 
be incorporated into a final product, which in turn would be targeted to the U.S. market. The court 
held that this evidence was insufficient to support jurisdiction under the FTAIA. Tellingly, the court in 
TFT-LCD recognized that, in effect, the SRAM court was making a determination of whether it was 
foreseeable to the defendants that there would be an effect on U.S. commerce because of the product 
specification and targeted market. But under a scope of risk analysis, the defendant should not be liable 
even for foreseeable harms if the actor’s conduct, in principle, does not violate antitrust policy. This 
highlights the importance of properly analyzing each requirement of the FTAIA separately; indeed, the 
scope of risk standard would prevent courts from conflating notions of “direct” and “foreseeability” and 
provides clarity to complex factual scenarios usually inherent in FTAIA cases. 
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Vii. COnCLUsiOn
 Until recently, the domestic effects exception of the FTAIA did not receive much 
attention in understanding the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law.196 As a 
result, few courts have attempted to interpret the meaning of “direct,” leaving courts 
and litigants confused about the scope of the FTAIA. Lacking a concrete standard, 
courts have conf lated the elements of “direct,” “reasonably foreseeable,” and 
“substantial,” although the FTAIA provides that each one should be considered 
separately in a domestic effects exception analysis.
 The Ninth and Seventh circuits have, however, recently defined “direct.” For 
example, the Ninth Circuit narrowly defined “direct” as an “immediate consequence,” 
which focuses on the immediacy and certainty of an effect on U.S. markets. In contrast, 
the Seventh Circuit defined “direct” as a “reasonably proximate causal nexus,” which 
provides a broader view on what conduct would have an effect on U.S. markets. While 
each court reached different conclusions, neither interpretation provides a clear standard 
for determining when to impose liability for alleged anticompetitive foreign conduct 
affecting competition in the United States. In short, these competing approaches 
potentially harm competition by allowing certain business behavior that Congress 
intended to regulate, while at the same time deterring lawful business behavior that 
truly does not harm U.S. markets.
 This note proposes a solution to this legal uncertainty by turning to established 
principles of tort law. Specifically, this note suggests that courts use a refined 
standard of proximate cause—the scope of risk standard—to define the “direct” 
requirement of the domestic effects exception. Under the scope of risk standard, 
courts can focus on the logical relationship between the alleged foreign conduct and 
the resulting effect on U.S. markets. The standard requires a simple inquiry into the 
harms risked by the alleged foreign conduct. The scope of risk standard is particularly 
useful under the FTAIA, where notions of “foreseeability” and “substantiality” 
expressly require separate consideration. Among other benefits, the scope of risk 
standard strikes an important balance in FTAIA cases: it provides courts with 
f lexibility in analyzing complex international antitrust cases while also providing an 
outer limit to the reach of U.S. antitrust law consistent with the plain language and 
spirit of the FTAIA.
196. See Delrahim, supra note 37, at 427 (“It has attracted less attention than the Empagran issue, perhaps 
because it has not featured in any Supreme Court decisions or high-profile class actions against 
international cartels.”).
